The advent of moral pluralism in the post-modern age leads to a set of issues about how pluralistic societies can function. The questions of biomedical ethics frequently highlight the larger issues of moral pluralism and social cooperation. Reflection on these issues has focused on the decision making roles of the health care professionals, the patient, and the patient's family. One species of actor that has been neglected has been those institutions which are part of the public, secular realm and which (...) have a particular moral heritage. Keywords: approval, compromise, condemnation, integrity, toleration CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The authors' novel approach to some interesting mathematical concepts - not normally taught in other courses - places them in a historical and philosophical setting. Although primarily intended for mathematics undergraduates, the book will also appeal to students in the sciences, humanities and education with a strong interest in this subject. The first part proceeds from about 1800 BC to 1800 AD, discussing, for example, the Renaissance method for solving cubic and quartic equations and providing rigorous elementary proof that certain (...) geometrical problems posed by the ancient Greeks cannot be solved by ruler and compass alone. The second part presents some fundamental topics of interest from the past two centuries, including proof of G del's incompleteness theorem, together with a discussion of its implications. (shrink)

"This fine book is ideal for introductory courses in philosophy, and it is executed and backed up by careful, sophisticated philosophical analysis and insight." —_W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Fordham University_ _ _ _Human Knowing_ is a clearly written, brief introduction that guides the reader through an exploration of sense perception, ordinary knowing, scientific knowing, and philosophic knowing. This journey culminates in a justification of philosophy as a genuine form of knowing and thus a natural prelude to metaphysics. Though Felt manages (...) to avoid technical language, the development of his argument is a genuine exercise in philosophic thinking. The outcome is a contemporary expression of a position similar to that of Thomas Aquinas, significantly enriched by insights from Bergson, Whitehead, and phenomenology. (shrink)

W. Norris Clarke, S. J.; A Curious Blindspot in the Anglo-American Tradition of Antitheistic Argument, The Monist, Volume 54, Issue 2, 1 April 1970, Pages 181–2.

The mechanism of stellar aberration was explained and formulated by Bradley in terms of the existence of a unique reference frame for light propagation. However, Einstein's denial of the existence of such a frame appears to undermine Bradley's interpretation of the phenomenon. It is suggested that the recent evidence for a cosmologically-based inertial reference frame provides a new physical basis for Bradley's explanation in a manner consistent with the requirements of special relativity. It is shown that a “delay” effect is (...) also involved in our observation of the direction of nearby sources, and that the aberration and delay effects exactly compensate for nearby sources comoving with a terrestrial observer. (shrink)

Plato is one of the key ancient authors studied by both classicists and philosophers. This long-awaited new edition contains seven of the dialogues of Plato, and is the first in the five-volume complete edition of his works in the Oxford Classical Texts series. The result of many years of painstaking scholarship, the new volume will replace the now nearly 100 year old original edition, and is destined to become just as long-lasting a classic.

In the preface to this book Stephen Toulmin recalls how Wittgenstein's later work appeared to his English students "as unique and extraordinary as the Tractatus had appeared to Moore." "Meanwhile," he recalls, "for our own part, we struck Wittgenstein as intolerably stupid, and he was sometimes in despair about getting us to grasp what he was talking about." Toulmin suggests that this "mutual incomprehension" was due to a "culture clash: the clash between a Viennese thinker whose whole mind had been (...) formed in a post-Kantian environment, and an audience of students who came to him with attitudes and preoccupations shaped by the neo-Humean empiricism of Moore, Russell and their associates." Engel's book is meant primarily to show that Wittgenstein's thought grows out of the Kantian philosophy, but not that it is simply derived from Kant. Rather, according to Engel, Wittgenstein was the first to see the full value of the insights of Kant and Schopenhauer. Engel bases his argument on the Blue Book. According to Engel the argument of the Blue Book comprehends two divergent theories of the origin of metaphysics. These two theories are represented in Engel's book by Ayer and Lazerowitz. For Ayer metaphysics is grounded in the inherently deceptive character of language; and the way to overcome metaphysics is but to be attentive to language. Lazerowitz, on the other hand, attempts to explain why it is that language is deceptive. Lazerowitz's argument as presented by Engel requires as a premise the proposition that the deceptions of language are not that intrinsically difficult to see through, or that metaphysical arguments are obviously "innovations." And therefore the origin of metaphysics must be sought outside of the structure of language. Lazerowitz locates the root of metaphysics in the passions, specifically, in fear--in the fear of change which is ultimately the fear of death. Engel sees each of these positions as in its way legitimate but essentially partial. Wittgenstein's thought is thus more profound than that which is derived from it. It is precisely this awareness of the necessity for both kinds of explanation that Wittgenstein, according to Engel, inherited from the tradition of Kantian metaphysics: in the first Critique's seeking both to account for the impossibility of metaphysics while, at the same time, arguing for the necessity of metaphysics as a natural disposition or arguing for the necessity of a "will to metaphysics." While Engel's argument is not as clear or thorough as it ought to be, his thesis, that Wittgenstein's work is not simply a "repudiation of our philosophical tradition, but rather is its proper twentieth-century continuation," is--in the main--convincing. The book is worth reading.--J. W. S. (shrink)

Implicit processes almost certainly preceded explicit processes in our evolutionary history, so they are likely to be more resistant to disruption according to the principles of evolutionary biology [Reber, A. S. . The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 1, 93–133.]. Previous work . Knowledge, nerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.]) has shown that implicitly learned motor skills remain (...) stable under psychological pressure and concurrent cognitive demands, and recently [Poolton, J. M., Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. . Passing thoughts on the evolutionary stability of implicit motor behaviour: Performance retention under physiological fatigue. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 456–468.] showed that they also remain stable under conditions of anaerobic fatigue that would have significantly challenged the survival skills of our ancestors. Here we examine the stability of an implicitly learned motor skill under fatigue conditions that primarily tax a different physiological system , but which have equally strong evolutionary connotations. Participants acquired a throwing task by means of an errorless learning method or an errorful method. Motor performance in the errorless condition, but not the errorful condition, remained stable following an exhaustive VO2 max. running test. Our findings replicate and extend the work of Poolton et al., providing further support for Reber’s evolutionary distinction between implicit and explicit processes. (shrink)

© 2014 Taylor Francis. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends routine human immunodeficiency virus testing of every client presenting for services in venues where HIV prevalence is high. Because older adults have particularly poor prognosis if they receive their diagnosis late in the course of HIV disease, any screening provided to younger adults in these venues should also be provided to older adults. We examined aging-related disparities in recent and ever HIV testing in a probability sample of at-risk (...) adults seeking services in needle exchange sites, sexually transmitted disease clinics, and Latino community clinics that provide HIV testing. Using multiple logistic regression with generalized estimating equations, we estimated associations between age category and each HIV testing outcome. Even after controlling for covariates such as recent injection drug use, older adults had 40% lower odds than younger adults did of having tested in the past 12 months or ever. Aging-related disparities in HIV testing exist among clients of these high HIV prevalence venues and may contribute to known aging-related disparities in late diagnosis of HIV infection and poor long-term prognosis. (shrink)

This is a surprisingly good book. Published by Longmans in Great Britain as part of a series on "Education Today," it provides a very lucid and cogent first glimpse at the discipline of the philosophy of religion. The author's perspective is derivative of the analytic school, but what makes the book so valuable is that Goodall relates linguistic distinctions to Biblical categories. The author makes it obvious that he is a believer and authenticates the conviction that one can be a (...) believer and still sound like Flew or Ryle. The influence of Ian T. Ramsey comes through loud and clear. Goodall presents his proofs for the validity of religious statements with clarity and vigor. Worth the price of the book alone is Goodall's discussion of Lear's "The pobble who had no toes."--W. A. J. (shrink)

'Uncertainty and chance' is a subject with a broad span, in that there is no academic discipline or walk of life that is not beset by uncertainty and chance. In this book a range of approaches is represented by authors from varied disciplines: natural sciences, mathematics, social sciences and medical sciences. At one extreme, this volume is concerned with the foundations of probability. At the other extreme, we have scholars who acknowledge the concept of chance and uncertainty but do not (...) cope with it by means of systematic measurement or quantative analysis. (shrink)

This collection of essays in moral philosophy has as its intended mark of distinction the fact that moral problems of the moment are the themes of the essays. The chapter headings indicate this contemporary concern: Abortion, Sex, Human Rights and Civil Disobedience, Criminal Punishment, Violence and Pacifism, War and Suicide and Death. There are essays by: Paul Ramsey, Philippa Foot, Jonathan Bennett, Thomas Nagel, Sara Ruddick, Richard Wassenstrom, [[sic]] John Rawls, R. M. Dworkin, William Kneale, H. L. A. Hart, J. (...) R. Lucas, Newton Carver, Jan Narveson, G. E. M. Anscombe, R. M. Hare, R. F. Holland, Mary Mothersill. One might well be inclined to agree with the editor's opposition to such philosophizing about morality which abstracts from the moral problems of one's own life. A purely theoretical approach to the study of morality would almost appear contradictory. However, it is necessary to express grave reservations about such a collection of essays as this. While the arguments of the essays are thoughtful and somewhat uncommon, the conclusions of the essays, as a rule, do not differ from "advanced" liberal opinions. In other words, the essays do not challenge students' opinions. The reading of these essays will but confirm the young in their prejudices. The problems the essays are concerned with are real problems; and it is a defect of the book that with the single exception of the chapter on Abortion no real opposing arguments are presented.--J. W. S. (shrink)

The "purpose of this book is to examine those conceptions of metaphysics prevalent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British philosophic thought." The book traces empiricist conceptions of metaphysics from Bacon onward to Reid and Stewart. Armstrong's treatment of Bacon is the most controversial chapter in his book. Armstrong opposes the widely held view that Bacon was essentially a mechanist. Armstrong argues that the texts usually cited to show that Bacon held the mechanical philosophy are at best ambiguous; while, on the other (...) hand, there are Bacon's clear statements on metaphysics as a science of formal causes. It is on the basis of these latter statements that Armstrong argues that Bacon's metaphysics is essentially Aristotelian. In the language of the tradition, Armstrong's interpretation of Bacon might be summed up as follows: Bacon understood metaphysics to be the science of formal causality; that is, he understood metaphysics as the science of Being as Being. Consequently, according to Armstrong, a characteristic empiricist metaphysics first appears in the thought of Hobbes. In Hobbes the mechanical philosophy is established as the science of nature, as the science of Being as Being. Metaphysics becomes defined once and for all within British Empiricism in opposition to physics or the materialist ontology. Beginning with Hobbes metaphysics is understood within British Empiricism as either epistemology or theology. This historical study should prove of interest to those who, brought up in the tradition of British Empiricism, are rediscovering the traditional questions of metaphysics.--J. W. S. (shrink)

This work is intended to be a "philosophical analysis" of certain problems encountered by the social sciences. The aim of the book is to "help redirect modern social science from some important theoretical mistakes." According to Kaplan most of our knowledge rests on common sense. It is the mark of common sense knowledge that it is not self-conscious, that it does not engage in a critique of its own possibility. The realm of the philosophy of history, of social science, and (...) of science is opened up through the attempt at "self-consciousness concerning the limits of the various processes by which knowledge is obtained." Kaplan accepts the proposition that the "framework within which knowledge occurs can never be included in knowledge itself," that the framework within which knowledge is acquired cannot be transcended. It might appear from his acceptance of this proposition that Kaplan would accept radical historicism. This is not the case. It is a primary intention of Kaplan to suggest that we can state the standpoint from which perspectival knowing exists, what it depends upon, and what it leaves out of account. Kaplan sees a measure of transcendence being achieved through the comprehension of different perspectives. However, he explicitly rejects the possibility of a true consciousness which would be the result of a single correct perspective on the world. The book has several major flaws. The greatest is the absence of sustained argument. The author fails to give evidence for the major propositions of the book. Usually a footnote to previous writings of his is offered as substitute for argument. Another major flaw of the book stems from Kaplan's understanding of what is characteristically human in the terms of systems analysis. To one not convinced in advance of the adequacy of this language to the task of understanding man, Kaplan's work will appear to suffer from an ill-conceived use of technical jargon.--J. W. S. (shrink)

Hegel’s basic position so far on the various meanings of evil as necessary and thereby intelligible directly in the development of spirit might be summed up as follows. Evil is always a necessary moment of instability which gives impetus in the movement from various meanings of particularity to various meanings of universality; from the more abstract expression of potential unity and truth to the more actualized notion and unity.

Hegel attempts both to give evil its metaphysical due and to give it intelligibility within a processive idealistic system. To accomplish these ends, he consistently employs the contrast between the natural and the free act of the subject and the contrast between the particular and the universal. He places these contrasts within the situation of an original and presupposed unity of spirit that itself is the ground of the mediation required for thinking freedom, for evil, and for ultimate reconciliation. He (...) argues for evil’s ultimate intelligibility in terms of its necessity as a consequent moment in the development of spirit from its ground; he resolves problems of evil’s penultimate irrationality in terms of its unstable contradictory elements in spirit’s history which is not yet fully concrete, a simultaneity of “ought to be” and “ought not to be” in the sense that the instability must be surpassed but not that it should never have been. The aims of this paper will be to summarize and evaluate Hegel’s efforts to give evil both significance and intelligibility within his system and to estimate if a system of progressive idealism contributes a philosophically new dimension to the problem of evil in a universe. (shrink)